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On May 14, 1999, in American Trucking Associations v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C.,
invoked the "non-delegation doctrine" to strike down new air pollution rules for
ozone and particulate matter.2 This decision has been attacked in some quarters
as resurrecting an outdated legal doctrine and dealing a setback to public health.
In fact, the court’s ruling is an extremely welcome development.
The non-delegation doctrine enforces the first sentence of Article I of the
Constitution: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress .
. ." This clause is the cornerstone of American democracy because it requires the
most politically accountable officials to take direct responsibility for the scope of
government – in particular, for the imposition of new taxes and new regulations.
For the first century of the Constitution, courts and commentators agreed that this
clause meant that Congress itself must set the legal standards and may not
delegate that job to executive branch agencies. Starting around 1900, however, a
budding hope that experts would save the people from themselves resulted in the
courts increasingly allowing Congress to delegate legislative power to agencies.
The showdown came in the 1930s after the Supreme Court invalidated important
New Deal legislation. President Franklin Roosevelt used the threat of his "court-
packing plan" to cow the Supreme Court into upholding his later programs.
Since then, the Court has invoked the non-delegation doctrine only selectively. In
a 1980 action known as the Benzene Case,3 the Court considered the secretary
of labor’s claim that a statute allowed him to regulate workplace air quality without
regard to the significance of the risk. The Court, in an opinion by Justice John
Paul Stevens, found that the secretary’s interpretation might well result in an
unconstitutional delegation. To avoid this, the Court interpreted the statute to allow
the agency to regulate only significant risks. Although this remedy has its virtues,
the Court was supplying the standard that Congress should have provided in the
first place. Most recently, in a 1998 opinion by Justice Stevens, the Court
invalidated the Line Item Veto Act because, in essence, Congress had delegated
its responsibility for setting budget priorities to the President.4
This month’s American Trucking case involved a challenge to the EPA’s stringent
1997 ozone and particulate standards by an array of industry groups and state
and local governments. EPA contended that the Clean Air Act gave it nearly
unbounded discretion to set any standard that it deemed protective of public
health. Judge Stephen Williams held that this interpretation resulted in an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; like the labor secretary’s
interpretation of his authority to issue workplace regulations, under EPA’s
approach there is no standard for determining the extent to which health must be
protected. The lack of such a standard is critical because, for most pollutants,
there are conceivable, though relatively minor, health consequences down to zero
ONPOINT
Clean Air, Congress and the
Constitution: Why The
Delegation Ruling Was
Correct
David Schoenbrod | May 26, 1999
How Green Was Common
Law?
David Schoenbrod | March 31, 1998
REGULATORY COMMENTS AND
TESTIMONY
Comments of Marlo Lewis on
a Potential Clean Power Plan
Replacement Rule
Marlo Lewis, Jr. | February 26, 2018
COALITION LETTERS
CEI Joins Coalition Letter
Urging Expanded Congress to
Expand Offshore Energy
Development Through
Revenue-Sharing Agreements
with the States
February 13, 2018
COALITION LETTERS
CEI Joins Coalition Letter in
Opposition to Raising the
Federal Gas Tax
February 12, 2018
More Energy and Environment
Home Publications Clean Air, Congress and the Constitution: Why The Delegation Ruling Was Correct
    
Search
Also by David
Schoenbrod
More about Energy
and Environment
About Issues Newsroom Publications Litigation Blog Events Donate
emissions. Without some statutory standard of decision, EPA can regulate
according to whim and politics. The court's remedy, set forth in a 2-1 panel
decision, is that EPA and not the court must interpret the statute to provide a
meaningful standard.
This judicially self-effacing remedy looks paltry at first blush, but it at long last puts
in jeopardy EPA’s standard-less interpretation of its authority. This interpretation
(for which I must admit to having argued as a lawyer for the Natural Resources
Defense Council in the 1970s) has allowed EPA to duck the scientific difficulties in
its own health rationales for new pollution regulations.
EPA could take the case to the Supreme Court, but the Court is unlikely to accept
the case at this stage. A second option is to ask Congress to enact EPA’s new
rules. That would honor the Constitution by having Congress take direct
responsibility. What we have now is quite the reverse: unelected bureaucrats act
to increase government control unless our elected politicians stick their necks out
to stop them. Because EPA likes its power, it will avoid this second option.
The agency’s third and final option is to come up with a meaningful standard to
guide its rulemaking. This is not an impossible task. Indeed, in a previous set of
cases dealing with occupational health, Judge Williams imposed a similar
requirement on the labor secretary; when his agency complied, the court affirmed
its action.5
While this third option would be good for the republic, it would have
consequences that EPA would prefer to avoid. By interpreting the statute to
provide a standard for protecting health, the agency would force itself to face the
difficult scientific questions that its standard-less approach allowed it to duck. The
Court of Appeals would then have a meaningful record to review. In addition, by
interpreting the statute so as to confront, rather than avoid, the very real questions
of degree regarding the extent to which health should be protected, EPA could no
longer posture itself as standing solely for health, nor portray its critics as standing
for greed.
The ultimate purpose of the non-delegation doctrine is to force our elected
representatives in Congress to take responsibility for the scope of government.
The public supports this concept overwhelmingly; according to a recent CEI poll
on environmental issues, over 75 percent of the public favor requiring Congress to
approve new regulations before they go into effect.6 The consequences of
American Trucking, good as they are, do not yet serve this ultimate purpose, as
Judge Williams himself acknowledges. But if EPA does as Judge Williams
mandates, it will at least make manifest the extent to which Congress has ducked
its own responsibility. The stage will then be set for the Supreme Court to do more
to protect the Constitution from politicians seeking to dilute their accountability to
the electorate.
____________
1David Schoenbrod is a professor at New York Law School and an adjunct
scholar at the Cato Institute. He is the author of Power Without Responsibility -
How Congress Abuses the People Through Delegation. (Yale Univ. Press
1993).2No. 97-1440 (D.C. Cir.).3Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, v.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).4Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417 (1998).5International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir.
1994).6National Environmental Survey, prepared by the polling company for the
Competitive Enterprise Institute (Jan, 1999).
CEI on the Web
GlobalWarming.org
Safe Chemical Policy
Special Projects
10,000 Commandments
Agenda for Congress
Shrinking Government
Bureaucracy
1310 L Street NW, 7th Floor
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: 202-331-1010
Fax: 202-331-0640
Follow Us:     
Copyright © 2018 Competitive Enterprise Institute
